How the Brain Responds to Social Exclusion
How the Brain Responds to Social Exclusion
Participants who were socially excluded showed a larger N2 effect in trials where they had to inhibit a prepared response compared to non-excluded participants. This indicates that social exclusion makes people attribute more attention to the response conflict induced by No Go trials. The P3 effect, on the other hand, was smaller for excluded compared to included participants. This indicates that excluded participants exert less inhibitory control than included participants. Our results show that exclusion has a differential effect on the different sub-components of cognitive control: exclusion makes people invest more in the detection of a response conflict, but less in the actual inhibition of unwanted, impulsive responses.
Although exclusion has clear effects on the electrophysiological responses of the participants, the behavioral responses on the Go/No Go task do not seem to be influenced by exclusion. It could very well be that this is the case because the effects that show in the ERPs actually cancel each other out when it comes to behavioral outcomes on simple tasks: the combination of increased conflict detection (more cognitive control) and less inhibition (less cognitive control) in excluded participants could very well lead to a similar pattern of responses to the included participants. On the other hand, experiments that have looked at the effects of negative mood and negative feedback on cognitive control have also observed a decoupling of behavior and brain responses (Hajcak et al., 2004; Wiswede et al., 2009)
The current results show that the behavioral consequences of exclusion, such as decreased impulse control and increased aggression could very well be determined by a decreased inability to inhibit responses. Our findings also provide a strong neural basis for a previous finding that exclusion alters cognitive control (Jamieson et al., 2010). This study showed that exclusion decreases the ability to inhibit automatic reflexive eye movements, but not the ability to correct those reflexive errors. When we combine these findings with our current results, a clear picture emerges of the effects of exclusion on cognitive control. On the one hand, exclusion leads to a decrease in impulse inhibition, signified by the decreased P3 reported here, and the inability to suppress automatic responses reported by Jamieson and colleagues (2010). On the other hand, exclusion does not change, or perhaps even stimulates, the overall ability to detect and correct conflicts and errors, as signaled by the increase in N2 effect for No Go stimuli, and the intact ability to correct errors in the antisaccade task (Jamieson et al., 2010).
The fact that we observed an increase in the N2 effect for excluded participants also shows that exclusion does not lead to decreased cognitive control on all fronts. Actually, the current results show that excluded people are better able to detect conflicts. Perhaps this ability to detect conflicting information, combined with a reduced inhibition lies at the basis of findings that exclusion does not always have detrimental effects on performance. For example Akinola and Mendes (2008) showed that people who experience social exclusion perform better on a creative task than included controls.
It has often been suggested that dealing with negative experiences such as social exclusion depletes the limited resources available to regulate behavior (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Fishbach et al., 2003; Gray, 2004; Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Indeed, imaging results indicate that social exclusion activates those brain areas that underlie cognitive control (Eisenberger et al., 2003), which suggest that social exclusion involves some level of emotion-regulation or control. However, the present results show that controlling the stress of social exclusion in itself does not drain all the resources available to subsequently control behavior. Instead the current results suggest that exclusion leads to a re-allocation of resources to specific sub-processes involved in cognitive control. This indicates that the behavioral consequences of negative experiences such as social exclusion do not need to be based on passive depletion of resources. Instead, those behavioral consequences might also be (partially) due to a rebalancing of priorities within the psychological system.
It thus seems that the profound experience constituted by social exclusion has very direct consequences for the basis of the ability to regulate behavior. The building blocks that constitute cognitive control are altered, even when subjects only experience exclusion in a virtual environment. This is important, because social exclusion is prevalent, for example within discrimination and humiliation, but it is often regarded as a very temporary state. Therefore, exclusion could be seen as relatively harmless. However, the current results show that the costs of social exclusion for the excluded might be a lot higher than just hurt feelings.
Discussion
Participants who were socially excluded showed a larger N2 effect in trials where they had to inhibit a prepared response compared to non-excluded participants. This indicates that social exclusion makes people attribute more attention to the response conflict induced by No Go trials. The P3 effect, on the other hand, was smaller for excluded compared to included participants. This indicates that excluded participants exert less inhibitory control than included participants. Our results show that exclusion has a differential effect on the different sub-components of cognitive control: exclusion makes people invest more in the detection of a response conflict, but less in the actual inhibition of unwanted, impulsive responses.
Although exclusion has clear effects on the electrophysiological responses of the participants, the behavioral responses on the Go/No Go task do not seem to be influenced by exclusion. It could very well be that this is the case because the effects that show in the ERPs actually cancel each other out when it comes to behavioral outcomes on simple tasks: the combination of increased conflict detection (more cognitive control) and less inhibition (less cognitive control) in excluded participants could very well lead to a similar pattern of responses to the included participants. On the other hand, experiments that have looked at the effects of negative mood and negative feedback on cognitive control have also observed a decoupling of behavior and brain responses (Hajcak et al., 2004; Wiswede et al., 2009)
The current results show that the behavioral consequences of exclusion, such as decreased impulse control and increased aggression could very well be determined by a decreased inability to inhibit responses. Our findings also provide a strong neural basis for a previous finding that exclusion alters cognitive control (Jamieson et al., 2010). This study showed that exclusion decreases the ability to inhibit automatic reflexive eye movements, but not the ability to correct those reflexive errors. When we combine these findings with our current results, a clear picture emerges of the effects of exclusion on cognitive control. On the one hand, exclusion leads to a decrease in impulse inhibition, signified by the decreased P3 reported here, and the inability to suppress automatic responses reported by Jamieson and colleagues (2010). On the other hand, exclusion does not change, or perhaps even stimulates, the overall ability to detect and correct conflicts and errors, as signaled by the increase in N2 effect for No Go stimuli, and the intact ability to correct errors in the antisaccade task (Jamieson et al., 2010).
The fact that we observed an increase in the N2 effect for excluded participants also shows that exclusion does not lead to decreased cognitive control on all fronts. Actually, the current results show that excluded people are better able to detect conflicts. Perhaps this ability to detect conflicting information, combined with a reduced inhibition lies at the basis of findings that exclusion does not always have detrimental effects on performance. For example Akinola and Mendes (2008) showed that people who experience social exclusion perform better on a creative task than included controls.
It has often been suggested that dealing with negative experiences such as social exclusion depletes the limited resources available to regulate behavior (Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999; Muraven and Baumeister, 2000; Fishbach et al., 2003; Gray, 2004; Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Indeed, imaging results indicate that social exclusion activates those brain areas that underlie cognitive control (Eisenberger et al., 2003), which suggest that social exclusion involves some level of emotion-regulation or control. However, the present results show that controlling the stress of social exclusion in itself does not drain all the resources available to subsequently control behavior. Instead the current results suggest that exclusion leads to a re-allocation of resources to specific sub-processes involved in cognitive control. This indicates that the behavioral consequences of negative experiences such as social exclusion do not need to be based on passive depletion of resources. Instead, those behavioral consequences might also be (partially) due to a rebalancing of priorities within the psychological system.
It thus seems that the profound experience constituted by social exclusion has very direct consequences for the basis of the ability to regulate behavior. The building blocks that constitute cognitive control are altered, even when subjects only experience exclusion in a virtual environment. This is important, because social exclusion is prevalent, for example within discrimination and humiliation, but it is often regarded as a very temporary state. Therefore, exclusion could be seen as relatively harmless. However, the current results show that the costs of social exclusion for the excluded might be a lot higher than just hurt feelings.